+**<>*■ 




© 
o 



*^**S* 



Class 
BookJJL:3JL 



Author 



Title 



Imprint 



16—47372-1 GPO 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

000014^7212 




REMARKS 



OF 



MR. 'CALHOUN, OF SOUTH CAROLINA,: 



ON THE 



V- 



GRADUATION BILL. 



IN SENATE, TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1839. 



WASHINGTON: 

PRINTED BY BLAIR AND RIVES : 
1839. 









REMARKS. 



PUBLIC LANDS. 

In Senate, January 15, 1839 — On the engrossment 
of the bill for graduating the price of public 
lands. 

Mr. CALHOUN said: I have no desire, Mr. 
President, to retard, in the smallest degree, the final 
action of the Senate on this bill; and in order to 
avoid unnecessary consumption of time, I intend 
to state, as concisely as possible, my views of the 
proper policy to be pursued in reference to the 
public lands lying within the limits of the new 
States; and my reasons fcr voting against the en- 
grossment of this bill. 

I shall begin with premising that I am under 
strong conviction, both from observation and re- 
flection, that we have arrived at the period when 
an entire revolution of our land system, as far as it 
is applicable to those States, is unavoidable. They 
have, in fact, outgrown the system. Since its first 
adoption, they have come into existence, have 
passed through a state of infancy, and have now 
arrived at manhood. The system which was wise 
and just at first, is neither wise nor just applied to 
them in their changed condition. 

We have heard much, Mr. President, in the pre- 
sent discussion, about the growth of the new 
States; but, if I may judge from the various mea- 
sures proposed on the present occasion, we have 
neither realized iis rapidity, nor the unavoidable 
changes in our land system which must follow in 
its train. Their wonderful growth is, indeed, one 
of those realities almost beyond the grasp of ima- 
gination. When I go back twenty-seven years, to 
the period when I first became a member of the 
other House, and compare what the new States 
then were, to what they now are, I am lost in won- 
der and amazement. Their growth is without ex- 
ample. There is nothing like it in history. At 
that time there was but a single new State, (Ohio.) 
I exclude Kentucky, Tennessee, and Maine, all of 
which have been admitted since the adoption of the 
Constitution, and limit my remarks to those which 
have since sprung up on the public domain. 

Ohio had then but one Representative in the 
other House, Jeremiah Morrow, an honest and 
sensible man, who was at that time at the head of 
the Committee on Public Lands, and had the con- 
fidence of the House so completely that his voice 
was the law on all subjects connected with them. 
So little interest did they, at that time, excite. 
There were then thirty-two Senators in all, of 



which Ohio had, of course, two; that is, the one- 
sixteenth of the whole. In the electoral college 
she had three votes, which made her wright about 
the one-fiftieth in that body — a weight scarcely 
felt or estimated in the political movements of the 
day. 

Such, at that time, was the infant and feeble 
condition of the new States. Since then, in a pe- 
riod but little exceeding that allotted to a single 
generation, to pass over the stage of life, how won- 
derful the change! Instead of one, as then, there 
are now nine new States; and in the place of two 
Senators in thirty-two, we now have eighteen in 
fifty-two; making, instead of one-sixteenth, more 
than a third of the whole; and already three Terri- 
tories, Florida, Wisconsin, and Iowa, are strug 
gling for admission. When admitted, which must 
be shortly, there will then be twelve new States, 
with twenty-four Senators in fifty-six, which will 
increase their relative weight in this body to three- 
sevenths of the whole. 

But as wonderful as has been the increase in 
this body, it will be still more so, after the next 
census, in the other. It will be : taken next year, 
and a new apportionment of the members will be 
made under the Constitution; when, instead of a 
single member, being less than one in a hundred 
as was the case twenty-seven years ago, the repre- 
sentation of the new States will then stand to the 
old, at least, as forty to sixty, or two-fifths of the 
whole, as calculated by a friend familiar with the 
subject, and in|whose accuracy I have entire confi- 
dence. The new States having, as they will then, 
three-sevenths in this, and two-fifths in the other 
House, will, of course, have a relative weight in 
the electoral college, or the same thing in a choice 
of a President, compounded of the two, that is, 
five-twelfths of the whole. So much for the past. 

Now if we turn to the future, we shall find the 
cause of this amazing growth so far from being ex- 
hausted or weakened, is acting with increased 
force, and urging forward the growth of those 
States with accelerated, instead of a decreasing, ve- 
locity; so much so, that ihe past changes in the last 
twenty-seven years will appear as nothing, com- 
pared with what will take place in the next twenty- 
seven, unless some unforeseen occurrence should 
intervene to retard their progress. If my memory 
serves me, our population, twenty-seven years ago, 
was about seven millions; and our annual increase 
then, that is, the excess of births over deaths, in- 
cluding emigration, about two hundred thou- 



sand, estimating our growth at three per cent. 
compound. Since then, our population has in- 
creased not less than nine millions, making the pre- 
sent probably about sixteen; which, on the same 
data, will make our annual increase at this time 
"but little short of half a million; the greater part of 
which will find their homes in the new States. 

I will not enter into a minute calculation as to 
ihe effects of this great increase on the relative 
•weight of the new and old States at the next suc- 
ceeding census, in 1850. It is safficient to say, that 
it will give a decided majority to the former, both 
in the House of Representatives and in the electoral 
college, and, of course, in the Government; and 
thus, in the short space of one generation and a 
ialf, the centre of political power, as between the 
old and new States, will have passed from the for- 
mer to the latter. 

Now, with these unquestionable results before 
us, I ask, not whether it would be wise to continue 
the old system; no, sir! a far bolder question, will it 
he practicable? And if not practicable, would it be 
wise to struggle to continue it, till overthrown by the 
force of unavoidable and irresistible causes? I ask, 
what would be the effects of such a struggle? 
"Would it not be to excite, in the first instance, ani- 
mosity and discord between the old and new States, 
and, in the end, to overthrow the entire land sys- 
tem, with the certain loss, ultimately, of the public 
domain? I shall not, en this occasion, attempt a 
formal discussion of these points. I propose in or- 
der to illustrate, simply to show how vain and dan- 
gerous would be the attempt to hold on to the pre- 
sent system, under these great and growing changes, 
"by tracing its operation under a single aspect, its 
"bearing on the Presidential question. 

To have a clear conception of this, we must 
"bear in mind, that after the next census the new 
States will have five-twelfths of the electoral 
college; and, of course, compared to either of 
the other sections, a controlling voice in the election 
ot a President. He who keeps this in mind, and 
understands the workings of the human heart and 
of our system, must see, that in the Presidential 
contest, (for such it must ever be,) the great point, 
hereafter, will be to secure their favor; and that 
this can best be done by favoring their peculiar 
views and policy in reference to the public lands. 
Now one of two things must follow: either all the 
candidates will enter into this competition, in which 
case the struggle will be who shall go farthest, and 
its consequence to give the vote to him who may 
bid highest. It is easy to see how this would end. 
The public domain, the noble inheritance of the 
people of this Union, would be squandered, or 
rather gambled away, in the contest; and would 
thus be made, at the same time, the means of plun- 
der and corruption, and of elevating to power the 
most profligate and audacious. 

But if, instead of all the candidates seeking the 
favor of the new States, a part should court their 
interests', and the others that of the old States, the 
train of events would, indeed, be varied, but the 
ultimate result would be the same. On this suppo- 
sition each of the candidates would resort to means 
best calculated to secure the section on whose sup- 
port he might rely. Tho?e looking to the new 
States would push to the extreme the favorite policy 



of those States in reference to the public lands; 
while the others would take the opposite extreme 
in favor of the old States. Now, when we reflect 
that the new and the old States must necessarily, 
from their different position and relation to the pub- 
lic lands, entertain very different views of the po- 
licy that ought to be pursued in relation to them, in 
almost every point— so much so, that the one shall 
consider that but as the demands ©f justice which 
the other shall regard as nothing short of open plun- 
der, as we have witnessed in this discussion — we 
may form some conception of the violence of the 
conflict which must ensue in the case supposed. 
We have had, even in this early stage, and on this 
very question, some indications of what we may 
expect. The most violent animosity and hatred 
would follow, and every man, be his motives ever 
so pure and patriotic, would be regarded the friend 
or the enemy of the new or the old States, as his 
opinions favored the policy of the one or the other. 
The final termination of the conflict would not be 
doubtful. Whatever turns of fortune might occur, in 
its progress, the new States must, in the end, pre- 
vail. Their relative increase is far more rapid than 
the old; so much so, that after 1850 — that is, after 
the third Presidential election from the next — they 
would be left, as I have shown, in undisputed pos- 
session of the field. In the mean time, while the 
struggle is going on, the animosity would daily in- 
crease on both sides. The longer it continued the 
more bitter it would become, and the more certainly 
and completely would the present system be over- 
thrown, if, indeed, the Union itself should be strong 
enough to withstand the shock. Such must inevi- 
tably be the fate of the present system, should we 
have the folly, I might say the madness, to attempt 
to continue it as it is, so far as the new States are 
concerned, regardless of the great changes wkich 
have already taken place, and the still more mighty 
in progress. 

Having now pointed out the danger, I turn next 
to the deeply important question of remedy, which 
demands the most prompt and solemn considera- 
tion, both of the Government and the community. 
The question is, what means shall we adopt to 
avert the mischief which I have shown to be so 
rapidly approaching, and which must inevitably 
soon arrive, if not prevented by some speedy and 
efficient measure? Already one has been pro- 
posed, originally brought forward to relieve a dis- 
tended Treasury of its burden, but which its au- 
thor (the Senatoi from Kentucky, Mr. Clay) has re- 
newed on the present occasion, doubtless with the 
view, in part, at least, to meet the growing disorders 
of the system. His proposition is to divide the pro- 
ceeds of the public lands among the States, with 
the double view, I suppose, to a more equal parti- 
cipation in the advantages of the public domain by 
the members of the Union, and to preserve the pre- 
sent system by a more vigilant guardianship of the 
States. I do not now intend to discuss the merits 
of this measure. My object is simply to state, in 
general terms, my opinion in relation to it, wiihont 
entering into the reasons on which it is grounded. 

There appears, then, to me, to be great and de- 
cisive objections to the measure. The right to 
adopt it may, in the first place, be fairly ques- 
tioned. We hold the public domain as a common 



property or fund) belonging to the States of the Union 
in their confederated, and not in their individual 
character. They were acquired either by purchase, 
out of common funds belonging to the Union, or by 
cession from the States to the Union, to be held as 
a fund in common; and I am at a loss to conceive 
what right we have to make that which belongs to 
the whole Union as a common fund, the separate 
fund of each State. It seems to me that it cannot 
be done without a manifest breach of trust and a 
violation of the Constitution. This is no new 
opinion, formed for the occasion. It was, on the 
contrary, formed when its author first introduced 
the measure, and when he and myself thought 
alike as to the necessity of relieving the Treasury 
of its surplus, in order to avoid the difficulties and 
the dangers which have since followed. Believing, 
then, that it would be effectual for that purpose, 
and more easily adopted than any other, I exa- 
mined it with an inclination to embrace it as a 
temporary measure of relief against a pressing evil; 
but it was impossible for me to bring my mind to 
assent to the right of adopting it. 

But suppose this difficulty surmounted, there are 
others, which I regard as insurmountable. Among 
them the fiscal objection is very formidable. The 
revenue from the lands cannot be spared at present, 
and if distributed, as proposed by the measure, 
would necessarily throw the whole expenses of the 
Government on a single source — the duties on im- 
ports — and which must be followed by their increase. 
This would neither be fair, nor equal; and to which 
I, representing in part, a portion of the Union, on 
which the increased burden would mainly fall, can- 
not assent. 

But as formidable as is this, there are others far 
more so. It would not meet, or avert the ap- 
proaching danger. It would still leave the public 
lands in the new States, under the operation of the 
present system, and the subject of violent con- 
flict between them and the old States, with all the 
calamitous consequences to which I have adverted. 
Instead of preventing the danger, it would, in fact, 
hasten and aggravate it. It may be laid down as 
a maxim, that no measure can avert it, which is 
not adopted with the approbation and consent of 
the new States; for the simple reason, that they 
must soon become the predominant power; when 
that which was established against their consent 
would be certainly overthrown. Such would be 
the case with the measure under consideration. If 
adopted, it must not only be without the consent of 
those States, but with their strenuous opposition, of 
which we have had the most conclusive evidence 
on the present occasion. When moved by its au- 
thor, as an amendment to this bill, it was violently 
opposed at the threshold from that quarter, and re- 
ceived but a single vote from the new States. It 
is not necessary to inqure whether this opposition 
on their part is reasonable, or not; whether it is 
the result of mere prejudice, or of deliberate con- 
viction that it is hostile to thdr interests. The 
fact itself, that there is an almost universal and 
determined resistance to the measure on their part, 
right or wrong, is, of itself, sufficient proof that it 
cannot be relied on to avert the threatening danger. 
On the contrary, its necessary effect must be to ac- 
celerate and aggravate it. Its adoption would, at 



once, bring the old and new States into violent 
conflict, in which the fomer would be arrayed, 
almost to a man, in determined effort to overthrow 
the arrangement, or some more hostile measure. 
Add to this that the Presidential contest would not 
fail to run into the controversy, and thus redouble 
the excitement and animosity, with all the fatal 
consequences which I have shown must follow 
from blending the two. 

Assuming, then, that the scheme is both objec- 
tionable and inefficient, the question again occurs, 
what ought to be done? My mind is made up, 
after the most serious and deliberate reflection, that 
there is, and can be, but one remedy: to cede — no: 
that is not the proper, the constitutional word — to 
dispose of the public lands to the States within the 
limits of which they respectively lie, on such terms 
and under such conditions as shall, at the same 
time, be just and liberal to the new States and safe 
to the old. We must, in a word, part with the own- 
ership and administration of the lands lying within the, 
States, leaving those in the Territories, and beyond, 
under the operation of the present system. The 
evil lies in ownership and administration, and without 
parting with them no permanent or effectual remedy 
can be applied. 

But what shall be the terms — what portion of the 
proceeds of the sales of those lands shall be left to the 
States, to remunerate them for the expense, trouble, 
and responsibility of their administration, and what 
portion shall be paid over to the Government an- 
nually as a compensation for the land? I am net 
prepared to answer this question. Its decision must 
depend on a careful and minute examination of all 
the facts and circumstances of the case. But I am 
decidedly of the opinion that the portion to be left 
to the new States ought not only to be ample to 
cover the trouble, expense, and responsibility of 
management, but very considerably beyond, so as 
to unite their interests with ours, in order to give 
stability to the arrangement and insure care and 
fidelity in the management. Resting my estimate 
of the compensation on these principles, I have 
supposed that the new States might pay over an- 
nually one-half of the gross proceeds of sales to the 
Government, and have an ample sum left for their 
compensation. But this is a mere estimate, with- 
out sufficient data, and is, of course, liable to be 
increased or diminished after a careful calculation 
founded on facts. 

With these suggestions as to the terms, I next 
proceed to the conditions on which the lands ought 
to be disposed of. I propose to suggest only the 
most prominent, without pretending to a full enu- 
meration. 

In order to give, stability to the arrangement, it 
will be indispensable that the whole transaction 
should assume the form of a compact; and for this 
purpose, that Congress should pass an act contain- 
ing the terms and conditions of the transfer; and 
that each of the new States should pass one, on 
their part, to be irrevocable, assenting to the same, 
before it is made. The act of Congress should, of 
course, determine what part of the proceeds is to 
be paid annually to the Government, and the time 
and manner of payment; and also to provide for 
keeping regular books of accounts, to be open to 
the inspection of the Government, so that the exact 



state of the account between it and the States, may, 
at all times, be ascertained by the former. 

The act of Congress should also contain all the 
prospective provisions which may become necessa- 
ry in the future administration of the lands under 
the arrangement; and should then provide that the 
land laws, as modified by- the act, and as far as 
they are applicable to the new state of things, shall 
remain unchanged, without the consent of Con- 
gress, A provision of this kind would be not less 
essential to the States, than to the Government 
Without it there could be no stability nor unifor- 
mity. Without it the States would, in a short 
time, enter into a competition to turn the current of 
immigration, each towards itself, which would 
commence by a reduction of price, and end by a 
loss of the lands. But with the provision proposed, 
the system would retain its uniformity, and become 
more stable than at present. 

To enforce the faithful execution of the compact 
the act should also contain a provision that, in the 
event of the violation of the conditions of cession, 
all grants thereafter made by the State should be 
null and void. This would place the compact un- 
der the protection of the courts of the Union, and 
make it the interest of the State and its eitizens to 
observe it. In this connection, the liberal allowance 
proposed to be made to the States, in order to unite 
their interests with ours, would be important. The 
revenue which they would derive from the land 
■would be applied to roads, canals, or other improve- 
ments, that would create a powerful interest in fa- 
Tor of the arrangement; which, with the conditions 
proposed, and their sense of justice, would ensure, I 
trust, on their part, a faithful execution of the com- 
pact. 

Such, as it appears to me, should be the leading 
conditions; but, doubtless, there are many others 
which would be suggested by full and careful ex- 
amination of the subject. 

This, Mr President, is the general outline of the 
measure which I propose as a remedy; and which 
brings up the important question, would it accom- 
plish the object intended; that i<% would it arrest the 
growing conflict between the new and the old 
States? Would it prevent the public domain from 
being converted into a fund to make Presidents, 
and to be squandered away in the struggle 1 ? Aud, 
finally, would it substantially, and more effectually 
than any other measure, secure to the Union the 
benefit of the public lands lying within the new 
States. It is the conviction that it is better calcu- 
lated to secure these important results, than any 
other measure that can be devised, which has in- 
duced me to present it for consideration; and it is 
on that issue, exclusively, I intend to rest its fate. 
All I ask is a calm and impartial investigation, 
confidently believing it will bear the test, and 
willing to abide the result. Without attempting to 
enter on such an investigation now — for which I 
have not the necessary information, and, if I had, 
it would not suit the occasion — I propose to limit 
myself to a few very brief remarks in support of 
my conviction. 

That a measure, such as I have suggested, if it 
should be adopted with the hearty consent of the 
new States, would arrest the growing conflict be- 
tween them and the old, and take the public lands 



out of the vortex of the Presidential contest, must 
be obvious on a little reflection. It would remove 
the cause of conflict, the only effectual mode of 
preventing the threatened danger. Transfer the 
lands, and the administration of them, on just and 
liberal terms, to the States, and close our land, 
offices within their limits, and you will, at once, 
place the States beyond the reach of the action of 
the Government, and influence of Executive con- 
trol, and would thereby leave both the new and 
old, as far as the land question is concerned, free 
from all improper bias in the election of the Chief 
Magistrate, The only point of conflict that could 
possibly remain between them in reference to the 
lands, would be, as to the conditions of the cession; 
but it may be easily shown, that if the terms 
should be liberal and satisfactory, in the first in* 
stance, to the new States, as I have proposed, that 
they would neither have the disposition nor the in- 
terest to disturb the compact; or if they should, 
the hazard of losing the lands in consequence 
would be far less than it would be should the pre- 
sent system be continued. But there may be some 
who may admit this to be true, and yet object that 
the advantages which I anticipate from the mea- 
sure would be purchased, on the part of the old 
States, at loo great a sacrifice. It would be pre- 
mature to undertake to answer this objection be- 
fore it is ascertained what portion of the proceeds 
should be left to the States, and what paid over to 
the Government; and this cannot be done till after 
a laborious investigation, as has been stated. All 
I maintain at present is, that the portion allotted to 
the States should be not only just and liberal, but 
such as would interest them in preserving the ar- 
rangement. Thus far it would be obviously the 
interest of both parties, as has been shown. In 
the meantime, I have suggested an equal division 
of the proceeds, under the belief that it would be 
satisfactory to> the new States, and probably not 
far from the division which a rigid investigation 
would establish. 

But of one thing I feel assured, that, when the 
subject is fully examined, it will be ascertained 
that an apportionment of the proceeds may be fixed 
@n which will give to the Government a sum per 
acre as large, or not much less, on all the lands 
which might thereafter be disposed of, as it has re- 
ceived for what has been disposed of since the pre- 
sent price was fixed; and which would leave, at 
the same time, to the States a liberal and satisfac- 
tory allowance. If this should prove to be the 
fact, the interest of all parties, even in a pecuniary 
point of view, would be reeoneiled. But that 
would be taking too narrow a view of this impor- 
tant subject. To determine correctly the true inte- 
rests of the parties in this arrangement, we must 
raise our eyes above pecuniary considerations, to 
the far more interesting view — the political bearing 
of the measure. Thus viewed, the gain to both, 
and to the whole Union, would be incalculable. 
The new States would gain the ownership and ad- 
ministration of their whole domain — a gain not 
more essential to their own independence thc».i to 
the convenience of their citizens, who would there- 
by have their claims, connected with the public 
lands, adjusted by their own Legislature, instead of 
being dragged to a great distance from home to 



await the tardy and uncertain action of Congress. 
But their greatest gain would be, that they would 
be elevated to an equality with the other States in 
all respects, and exempted from the controlling in- 
fluence of the Government arising from a widely 
expanded system of land offices. 

To the Union the gain would be not less import- 
ant. Congress would be relieved from an immense 
and increasing mass of business, which now con- 
sumes at least one-third of its time, and be left free 
to turn its attention to other subjects of deep inte- 
rest, which it is now compelled to neglect. The ses- 
sions would be greatly shortened — a matter of im- 
portance, not only in a pecuniary, but still more in a 
political point of view. But these, though important, 
are but minor advantages. There are others im- 
measurably greater. It would close our land offices 
in the new States, and, with them, the door to the 
vast patronage and influence which they place in 
the hands of the Executive. Who can estimate 
this advantage? Who is there, that has a particle 
of patriotism or love of Republican institutions, 
who would not rejoice at the reduction of such im- 
mense patronage, made not only without injury, but 
with advantage, to the public? When we add to 
this that it would remove all causes of conflict be- 
tween the old and new States; that it would with- 
draw from the Presidential contest the public lands, 
that prolific source of corruption in the hands of 
the profligate; and, finally, that it would save our 
vast and noble domain itself from being squandered 
in the struggle, it is hardly in the power of calcula- 
tion to estimate the advantages that would result. 
Having now suggested what I believe to be the pro- 
per policy to be pursued in relation to the public lands 
within the new States, and hastily traced the ad- 
vantages of the measure I have suggested for con- 
sideration, the next question is, have we the right 
to dispose of the lands in the manner proposed? I 
would not have supposed that there could have 
been a doubt on this point, had not the Senator 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Webster] raised it on 
this, as well as on a former occasion. The Con- 
stitution gives to Congress, expressly, the right to 
dispose of the public lands; and why may they not 
dispose of them to the States as well as to indivi- 
duals? I can see no reason, and never have heard 
one assigned. We are in the daily habit of making 
grants to the States for public purposes; and if we 
may grant, may we not also sell or dispose of them, 
as I have proposed? The lands belong to the 
States, in their confederate character, as has been 
stated; and Gongress is the trustee to dispose of 
them for the common benefit. They are bound, 
in the fulfilment of the trust, to dispose of them to 
the best advantage; and if the disposition pro- 
posed be the best for ail concerned, Congress has 
not only the right to make it, but would be bound 
by the trust so to do. 

Entertaining these views, it may be asked why I 
have not brought forward the measure this session? 
My answer is, there is not time, at the present short 
session, to digest and carry through a measure of 
so much importance, and involving so many and 
such conflicting interests. But I pledge myself, if j against the bill 



present at the next session, to introduce it at an 
early day, and to use my best efforts to press it to 
a decision. If I can prevent it, no other measure 
relating to the public lands shall take precedence 
of it. 

I have now presented my views as to the policy 
which ought to be adopted in reference to the pub- 
lic lands within the new States; and it now re- 
mains, in conclusion, to assign my reason for vo- 
ting against the engrossment of this bill. 

Believing that nothing short of a radical change 
of policy, such as that proposed, can arrest the evils 
apprehended from the present system, I am of the 
opinion, that till some permanent remedy can be 
applied, that the proper course is to vote against 
all partial and temporary expedients like the pre- 
sent; and I shall, in conformity to that opinion, 
give my vote against this bill. I believe it to be the 
course, not only the lest calculated to insure, in 
the end, the application of a permanent and effici- 
ent remedy, but also to prevent, in the intermedi- 
ate period, the mischiefs naturally resulting from 
the present system. But in addition to these ge- 
neral reasons, there are others against this particu- 
lar measure, sufficient to induce me to vote against 
it. Passing others by, I shall only notice one. 

This bill is pressed on the Senate, on the 
ground, among other reasons, that it is a. financial 
measure. It is stated that the Treasury is deficit, 
and that one of the effects of the reduction of the 
price of the public lands would be a present in- 
crease of the revenue from that source. I am not 
prepared to say whether such would be the fact, 
not having examined the point sufficiently to fojm 
an opinion; but if it should be so, it would to me 
constitute an objection, instead of a recommenda- 
tion. It is admitted that the increase of the revenue 
would be temporary, and be followed in a short 
time by a corresponding reduction. Now, if I am 
not mistaken, the income of this and the ensuing 
year will, without further addition to the revenue, 
be sufficient to meet the expenditures, with due 
economy, and timely and judicious retrenchment. 
The pinch will be in the two subsequent years — ■ 
'41 and '42 — when six-tenths of the entire reduction 
under the compromise act will take plact.. The 
difficulty will be in passing through those two years, 
and this bill, considered as a measure of revenue, 
instead of passing now, ought to be postponed until 
then. Its passage at this time would but increase 
the difficulty two years hence. Whatever it might 
add to the income of this and the next year, would 
serve but to increase their expenditures to the same 
extent. Experience has taught us that our expen- 
ditures increase with our income, and that if there 
be money in the Treasury, it will be spent, regard- 
less of consequences. The result would be that, 
instead of aiding the Government to meet the fiscal 
crisis of '41 and '42, by increasing its income then, 
it would compel it to meet it under the great disad- 
vantage of increased expenditures with diminished 
means. Under this belief, if there were no other 
objection?, I would feel myself compelled to vote 



